Seminar: Rules-based order? Southeast Asia in the age of the deal

Venue: Auditorium, Australian Centre on China in the World, Building 188, Fellows Lane, ANU

Date/Time: 15 May 5-6.30pm

Panel Participants

Chair: Professor Evelyn Goh, ANU SEAI

Associate Professor, Marcus Mietzner, ANU Indonesia Institute

Dr Nicholas Chan, ANU Malaysia Institute

Associate Professor Dulyapak Preecharush, Thammasat University & ANU Myanmar Research Centre

Ms Roselle Tugade, University of the Philippines & ANU Philippines Institute

Abstract

Southeast Asia has long been a region caught in the crosshairs of overlapping order transitions, be it the rise and fall of imperialism, colonialism, socialism, capitalism, authoritarianism, democratisation, multilateralism or hegemony. Today, the world faces a rapidly changing international order in the face of great power revisionism, assertion and aggression, the rise of radicalism, economic de-coupling, and the second Trump presidency.

How is Southeast Asia faring and managing the ongoing contestations and renegotiation of key global, regional, and national compacts? Scholars at The Australian National University have long-standing research interests in the multiple dimensions of what helps to sustain peace, stability, and prosperity in this strategic region. Officials from Australia and Southeast Asia also often reiterate the importance of sustaining a rules-based order at the regional level, and of encouraging domestic arrangements conducive to such an order.

This plenary features speakers from the five ANU Regional Institutes that focus on Southeast Asia. The speakers consider the current state of rules-based orders and ordering practices at the regional, trans-national, and sub-national levels, drawing attention to the key challenges and developments that impact upon the strategic balance, the future of economic liberalism, the resilience of democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights.

2. Opening Speaker

Evelyn: Welcome remarks. Acknowledge first Australians.

Helen: Highlighting the long-standing tradition of research institutes in convening intellectually vibrant and timely events. Acknowledge first Australians. Reflected on the profound shifts occurring in the global landscape, noting the ongoing transition in world order alongside emerging threats and challenges. Against this backdrop, she posed a central guiding question for the seminar: How is Southeast Asia responding to these evolving challenges?

3. Participants’ contributions (Plenary notes)

Chair: Evelyn Goh

• Opened the session by welcoming speakers and framing the discussion around Southeast Asia's role in shaping international and regional order.
  - Emphasized that international order is neither static nor given, but negotiated, constructed, and dynamic. It is not the exclusive product of great powers, but the outcome of ongoing practices involving a wider range of actors-including Southeast Asian states.
  - Highlighted that Southeast Asia is not merely acted upon, but has actively contributed to ordering processes since the mid-20th century, shaping both regional and global structures.
• 1.International Order as a Negotiated Construct
  Goh underscored that international order is not pre-existing or immutable, but the result of continuous contestation and construction. Southeast Asia has long been situated in—and contributed to—shifting dynamics of economic, technological, financial, and security order. Recognizing the region's agency means treating international order as a lived, negotiated process rather than a top-down imposition.
• 2. Ordering as a Participatory Practice
  Goh argued that ordering is participatory, and Southeast Asian states have played key roles in shaping international norms, institutions, and frameworks:
  - The Bandung Conference and the Afro-Asian movement advanced critiques of Western-led norms on sovereignty and intervention.
  - ASEAN's diplomatic pushback against Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s.
  - Malaysia's proposal for the East Asian Economic Caucus, challenging Western-centric economic forums and paving the way for ASEAN+3.
  - Post-Cold War contributions to regional security architecture, including ASEAN's promotion of cooperative rather than adversarial principles.
• 3. Momentous (Re)Ordering and New Rule-Making
  Goh concluded by observing that we are currently in a period of momentous (re)ordering, with opportunities to shape new rules and new ways of being and relating internationally. Southeast Asia plays an important role in this environment by:
  - Offering conceptual alternatives to legacy frameworks such as bipolarity or hegemonic stability;
  - Driving functional initiatives in emerging rule-making domains: maritime conduct, alternative trade regimes (outside the WTO), critical supply chains, AI governance, climate action, and nuclear regulation;
  - Utilizing ASEAN-led mechanisms in contexts where global agreements are lacking or stalled.

Marcus Mietzner

• Examined RBO through the lens of Indonesian political leadership
• The term ‘RBO’ has been strategically employed by Western capitals—particularly the US, Europe, and Australia—as a normative benchmark for international conduct. Before the Trump presidency, RBO was a favored concept, often used to frame global political and funding priorities. However, as that order has fractured—exemplified by events such as Trump’s presidency and Russia’s actions—few in the Global South appear to lament its decline.
• Indonesia Drawing from extensive interviews conducted with key figures in Indonesia's leadership, Mietzner presented two distinct perspectives.
• 1. President Joko Widodo (Jokowi)
  - Jokowi viewed the RBO as a euphemism for a Western-dominated international system that worked against the interests of emerging powers like Indonesia. He believed that such an order constrained Indonesia’s path to industrialization, often through global institutions like the WTO, which he saw as enforcing outdated rules. For example, regulations on palm oil and export restrictions on nickel—over which Indonesia has been sued by the EU and US—were seen as mechanisms of control akin to a modern-day East India Company. Jokowi rejected Western IR terminology such as “hedging” or “bandwagoning,” perceiving it as disconnected from Indonesia’s lived experience.
• 2. President Prabowo Subianto
  - Prabowo brought a more explicitly geopolitical reading of RBO. Familiar with IR concepts, he interpreted the erosion of the RBO as exemplified by the Gaza conflict, where Western inaction was seen as hypocrisy. A realist in orientation, Prabowo has welcomed the RBO’s decline and adopted a pragmatic stance. He advocated bilateral deal-making with major powers such as China—offering arrangements on joint exploitation in disputed South China Sea areas—and has even brought realist thinkers like John Mearsheimer into his advisory circle.
• Conclusion: for both Jokowi and Prabowo, the global order is no longer understood through the lens of a normative framework like RBO. Instead, it is being replaced by a pragmatic, deal-centric mode of engagement with key states. Regionally, both leaders have expressed impatience with ASEAN’s slow consensus-based processes and increasingly favour bilateralism over ASEAN as the primary vehicle for foreign policy—particularly on issues like the South China Sea.

Ms Roselle Tugade

• Trained in international law and with a research focus on its history and theory, she offered a descriptive and analytical overview of how the Philippines engages with the international legal order and the concept of a Rules-Based International Order (RBIO). Rather than making normative claims, her presentation explored how Philippine state practice reflects both the practical deployment and scholarly interpretation of the RBIO, especially in areas where it overlaps with international legal.
• Her remarks opened space to critically examine how the term RBIO is increasingly used interchangeably with international law, particularly in Philippine foreign policy discourse. This conflation—where “rules” are implicitly understood as “legal rules”—has significant implications for both research and policymaking, especially in how legitimacy and compliance are framed.
• Drawing from the Department of Foreign Affairs policy paper (September 2023) and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s keynote address at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, she unpacked how the Philippine government uses the language of RBIO to position itself as a principled and law-abiding actor in international affairs, while navigating its historical ambivalence toward the evolving international order
• Ambivalence:
  An enduring ambivalence among Philippine policymakers toward the RBO. While figures like Marcos and Foreign Secretary Manalo publicly affirm the importance of international law—framing the RBO as rooted in the founding of the UN—they also treat it with caution. The RBO is often portrayed as both a defense of global order and a historically contingent construct in which the Philippines has played varying roles.
  The Philippines’ historical positioning within the RBO framework is complex: While it has actively engaged in international legal mechanisms (e.g. the 2016 South China Sea ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration), it has also passively inherited legal regimes dating back to colonial arrangements like the Treaty of Paris, which conjures the country more as an object of power than an autonomous actor.
• Strategic engagement with international law
  The Philippines positions itself as a rule-abiding and pathfinding partner, as exemplified by President Marcos’s public commitment to complying with international legal obligations, regardless of debates over institutions like the ICC. For instance, even when questions arise over jurisdiction, the Philippine government frames compliance as a matter of principle.
  However, Philippine engagement with international law is uneven. There is readiness to invoke the RBO in contexts like maritime law, climate change, sustainable development, and global health-where the state uses international norms to advance collective causes. Yet, it hesitates or avoids more contentious areas such as the fight against impunity and international criminal accountability.
• Conclusion: for the Philippines, the RBO does not necessarily represent a new normative framework but rather an extension of longstanding commitments to international law—albeit with strategic selectivity in its interpretation and application.

Dulyapak Preecharush

• A comprehensive analysis of Myanmar’s post-coup political structure, framing it as a contest between three distinct internal orderings: the Tatmadaw (military), the National Unity Government (NUG), and the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). His remarks focused on how these internal power dynamics intersect with great power politics, raising important questions about Myanmar’s role in the evolving regional and international order.
• 1. The Military Government (Tatmadaw)
  Rooted in the Burman heartland, the Tatmadaw seeks to control the state through a model of “Rule by Man” and praetorianism, with the armed forces acting as self-designated guardians of national unity. This logic continues the legacy of past military regimes and informs the regime's approach to future political transitions and elections.
• 2. The National Unity Government (NUG)
  The opposition government promotes “Rule of Law” and a new federal democratic order. The NUG seeks to abolish the 2008 military-drafted constitution and replace it with a civilian-led federal charter. Grounded in liberal-democratic principles, their agenda emphasizes constitutionalism, decentralization, and bottom-up governance.
• 3. Ethnic Minority Armed Organizations (EAOs)
  EAOs reflect diverse ordering imaginations, ranging from federalism and confederalism to autonomy, democracy, and even warlordism in some areas. While some, like the Karen National Union (KNU), align with the NUG, others like the Arakan Army pursue independent political visions. Northern Shan-based EAOs, for example, operate quasi-state institutions, creating a fragmented and ideologically varied political landscape.
• Link between internal order and external order
  Myanmar’s internal ordering is increasingly shaped by external powers. He raised the case of China’s strategic role—both escalating frontier conflicts and promoting peace in areas neglected by the U.S. or UN. This dual approach illustrates how a major power can recentre regional order in pursuit of its own interests.
  While Myanmar may appear to be heading toward a Chinese-led unipolar system, there is a possibility of emerging multipolarity, involving Russia, India, Japan, ASEAN, and the United States. These actors are increasingly involved in peace and reconciliation programs, suggesting the development of varieties of rules-based international order within Myanmar’s contested political space.
• Great-power alignments and regional implications:
  The U.S.-Japan-India bloc, under the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, continues to promote democracy and rule of law in Myanmar, but their leverage appears limited.
  Russia and China have expanded their footprint, with Russia assisting in infrastructure and defense—most notably collaborating with Myanmar’s junta to build nuclear power facilities, potentially for future WMD capabilities. This development raises serious regional security concerns
  Chinese authorities’ interventions in Northern Shan State—such as pressuring Tatmadaw forces to withdraw—suggest an effort to regulate localized political order and enhance Chinese authority in strategic border zones.
• Conclusion:
  He calls for more active engagement from ASEAN, the EU, and other regional players to shape both Myanmar’s internal developments and its external alignments. Understanding Myanmar’s political future, he argued, requires attention to both its internal contestations of order and the external configurations of power that define the varieties of rules-based international order emerging in the region.

Nicholas Chan

• Offered a sociologically grounded perspective on the Rules-Based Order (RBO), moving beyond legalistic interpretations to examine how rules, norms, and perceptions of order manifest in everyday life, digital spaces, and state behavior—particularly in Malaysia.
• RBO as a Social Framework for Status and Order
  Rather than dissecting formal legal regimes like UNCLOS, Chan focused on the deep social norms underpinning the RBO—those that shape how states navigate global hierarchies and pursue progress. For countries like Malaysia, these include: economic growth through industrialisation, faith in scientific problem-solving, non-revanchist behavior in foreign policy, and the embrace of an open economy. However, overt liberal commitments (e.g., on human rights) are often avoided, positioning Malaysia within the order-oriented (rather than liberal) end of the RBO spectrum.
  Malaysia’s alignment with the RBO has brought material benefits, particularly economic growth. However, amid global great power revisionism, Malaysian elites experience ambivalence: a sense of vindication in the face of U.S. backpedaling on liberal norms, yet anxiety over losing the stability and structure that the RBO has provided.  
• Information Disorder and Ontological Uncertainty
  The concept of information disorder, describing how today's sense of global and national disorder is not only political but also epistemological.
  Key features include:
  - A digitally saturated information space that creates chaos through both deliberate manipulation (e.g. right-wing movements, disinformation campaigns) and cognitive overload
  - The RBO no longer serves as a trusted mediator of truth and meaning, leading many decision-makers to perceive the world as messy and unmanageable
  This confusion does not lead to apathy but instead reactivates old societal fault lines-particularly in race, religion, and conspiracy narratives. While blame is often hard to assign in such disorder, societies revert to familiar villain-narratives, producing a distorted but emotionally resonant sense of ‘order’.
• Malaysia's Inertia Within the RBO
  Despite increasing uncertainty, there is significant institutional and normative momentum keeping countries like Malaysia anchored to the RBO. With much to lose in terms of stability and growth, Malaysia is unlikely to reject the system outright. However, its continued participation may be more about strategic calculation than ideological alignment.
• Conclusion: emphasise the importance of importance of understanding the RBO not as a fixed system of laws but as a social and discursive structure-one that is being contested, reimagined, and experienced unevenly across global hierarchies. He underscored that challenges such as radicalism in Malaysia stem less from electoral change and more from deeper ruptures in foundational norms.

Chair’s reflection: Evelyn Goh

• Expressing appreciation for the opportunity to engage with Southeast Asia not as a passive object of analysis, but as a dynamic and complex region in its own right.
• Emphasized the importance of moving beyond compartmentalized national perspectives and instead immersing in the region as it is—with all its contradictions, interconnections, and strategic agency.
• Underscored the value of regional thinking that resists reductive frameworks and embraces Southeast Asia’s multifaceted realities.

4. Discussion Q&A

• Dongkeun Lee (PhD SDSC, ANU):
  Question to Marcus: It appears that Indonesia is moving toward bilateral dispute resolution in the South China Sea. Based on your observations, China seems to follow certain norms in regional disputes. Will Indonesia accept these norms, and might other Southeast Asian countries follow?
  - Marcus Mietzner reply: Indonesia’s foreign ministry was reportedly shocked when the president made such overtures to China. This illustrates the ongoing transition between the rhetorical support for the RBO and a more realist orientation. When Prabowo visited Beijing in November, his statements contradicted the foreign ministry’s stance. If Prabowo continues to shape Indonesian foreign policy, he may align more with China. He adheres to a Mearsheimer-inspired worldview—power determines order. Like many Western countries, Indonesia now selectively invokes the RBO only when it serves its interests.
• Yi Wang (UNSW):
  Question to Dulyapak: Are China and Russia aligned in Myanmar, or do tensions exist? China seems cautious about Russia's military support for Myanmar's regime.
  - Dulyapak Preecharush reply: China has geopolitical dominance in Myanmar due to proximity, investment, and control over ethnic armed groups. While Tatmadaw views China as essential to its national strategy, it also welcomes Russian arms and influence to balance Chinese power. Despite this, China's role remains primary-especially due to the Belt and Road Initiative's infrastructure across Myanmar. The U.S. has limited leverage, creating a vacuum for Russia and China to fill.
• Christian (Undergraduate):
  It’s hard to find up-to-date sources on Southeast Asia-much of the content focuses on the U.S. or Europe. Any suggestions?
  - Evelyn Goh reply: Sign up for relevant mailing lists to stay informed.
  - Marcus Mietzner reply: Take courses focused on Southeast Asian politics-we teach them!
• Björn Dressel (SEAI):
  Question to panel: Who really participates in the RBO? Marcus implies it's shaped by strongman leaders; Ross suggests some states still believe in and want to expand the RBO. Are these deals just elite-driven? How do smaller Southeast Asian states relate to this?
  - Ross Tugade reply: I’d hesitate to say the Marcos government supports the RBO outright. Its invocation of international law is more about distinguishing itself from Duterte. However, small states have long used international law-such as UNCLOS or climate law-to assert themselves in global order-making.
  - Nicholas Chan reply: Dealmaking isn’t new; what's changed is the visibility. Media now frames dealmaking as a spectacle, but states and corporations have always done it. Deals reveal less about the order itself than about how power operates.
  - Marcus Mietzner reply: We’re in an order transition, not collapse. Prabowo tried to gain Trump’s attention but failed. ASEAN'’s consensus model—with equal voting power between vastly unequal members—limits effectiveness. Indonesia may move away if that doesn’t change.
• Helen:
  Question to Nick: In a world of information disorder and social media, how can students like Christian access reliable knowledge when actors have vested interests in manipulating information?
  - Nicholas Chan reply: We need to develop historical sensibility-look at sources from six months or two years ago to gain perspective.
  - Evelyn Goh reply: From an institutional perspective, this demands broader temporal and thematic awareness. Organisations must anticipate converging challenges, not just react to the present.
  - Ross Tugade reply: Affective sources can be powerful, like Filipino fishermen asserting the Hague ruling, or families of victims from the drug war. These offer public narratives of justice and accountability.
  - Marcus Mietzner reply: Disinformation isn’t new-Suharto's era thrived on it. What’s new is the chaos of competing narratives.
• Jonathan (School teacher, Queanbeyan):
  Question to Marcus: In Indonesia, is there a social contract between elites and the masses? Is the system designed to allow upward mobility, or just maintain order?
  - Marcus Mietzner reply: Indonesia’s political stability depends on elites monopolising leadership while allowing limited social mobility. Opinion polls suggest most people are content with the status quo due to gradually improving prosperity. There’s no imminent revolutionary potential.
• Undergraduate attendee:
  Question to Marcus: With increasing interest in the South China Sea, would Indonesia benefit more from engaging bilaterally with China or working through ASEAN?
  - Marcus Mietzner reply: Ideally, ASEAN would reform its decision-making process-for instance, by enabling majority voting rather than full consensus. But if the current model continues (e.g., Brunei has equal voting power as Indonesia), Indonesia may look elsewhere.
• ASEAN Desk, Department of Defence (Australia):
  Question to Marcus and Dulyapak: Australia enjoys ASEAN+ membership but struggles to justify its role in minilaterals. Meanwhile, ASEAN countries are forming their own minilaterals with China. What is Australia's role in this evolving ASEAN landscape?
  - Marcus Mietzner reply: Australia must undergo internal reflection about its identity and regional role. Its engagement with Southeast Asia often shifts with the government in power, creating confusion. Since COVID, ASEAN's coherence has weakened. Australia must first clarify its own position.
  - Dulyapak Preecharush reply: Historically, Australia was part of the Western Pacific theatre. In the post-Cold War era, the region encompassing the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, South and East China Seas—what Nicholas Spykeman call the Asiatic Mediterranean—is geopolitically crucial. It borders major economic centres. If the U.S. can effectively integrate with Australia, Japan, and India under the Indo-Pacific Order, it may help balance China's growing influence.

Evelyn Goh end-note:

• Reiterated the importance of engaging deeply with Southeast Asia (SEA) as a region in its own right—not as an esoteric or sui generis space, but as a microcosm of the world, with its complexity, contradictions, and dynamism compressed into a subregion. Crucially, it also happens to comprise Australia’s closest and most important neighbours.
• This is precisely why SEA continues to command attention—not only from scholars and policymakers across the world, but also as a core area of ANU’s mission. Understanding the region is not an academic exercise in exoticism, but a necessary intellectual and strategic imperative.

Report of the ANU SEAI Seminar | Prepared by Tommy Chai